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THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

RECORD

Colorado Supreme Court Decisions
Edited by the Committee on Supreme
Court Decisions:
C. Clyde Barker,
Chairman. Harold B. Wagner, Max P.
Zall.

No. 12,110
Villa Crosby v. T. Canino. doing business as The American Beauty Baking Company, and Walter G. Lett.
Decided June 11, 1928.

(Editors Note-It is intended in each
Issue of the Record to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the Supreme
Court. These abstracts will be printed
only after the time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or
in the event that a petition for rehearing
has been filed the abstract will be printed
only after the petition has been disposed
of).

No. 12,079
The People of the State of Colorado, on
the Relation of S. Julian Lamme,v.
Charles S. Buckland. ct al.
Decided June 18, 1928.
Mandamus
Facts-Relator's (laughter was expelled from high school for refusing to
comply with a ruling of the committee
requiring certain uniforms for girl pupils. Relator sued out a writ of mandamns to compel her reinstatement.
The writ was quashed and the action
dismissed, whereupon relator appeals.
Held-The statutes provide a system
of appeals from the decision of the committee to the County Superintendent of
Schools and thence to the State Board
of Education, and until relator has exhausted these remedies, mandamus is
premature.
No opinion is expressed
as to the reasonableness of the regulation nor as to the contention that the
matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the school authorities.
t

Affirmed, but wi hout prejudice to
Relator's rights under the statutory
system of appeals,
Mr. Chief Justice Denison specially
concurring, Mr. Justice Walker dissenting.

Violation of OrdinanceContributory Negligence
Facts-Plaintiff got off a
South
bound car on Broadway, and instead
of going to -the near curb, started
across to the East side of the street.
A North bound Broadway car was coming and plaintiff stepped back one step
to avoid this and was struck by defendant's truck, which had overtaken
and was attenpting to pass the line of
cars which were getting in motion after stopping when plaintiff got off the
street car. Plaintiff testified that the
way to the near curb was blocked by
a line of automobiles, some of which
were already in motion as the street
car moved on, that she sood a moment
and then turned to cross to the far
side. Plaintiff also introduced the ordinance requiring careful driving and
forbidding passing at intersections.
Defendants introduced the ordinance
requiring passengers to proceed "immediately to the sidewalk to the right",
and forbidding them to stand in the
street. The court non-suited plaintiff,
holding her guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Held-Although a violation of an ordinance is negligence per se. yet the
rule is otherwise where 'compliance
would require the doing of the impossible or taking a dangerous course
when an apparently safe one is open.
Here plaintiff's access to the near curb
was blocked by autos along side the
street car, some of them' already in
motion, and it was for the jury to say
whether or not she acted reasonably
in attempting to cross to the far side
of the street, instead of attempting to
go in front of these automobiles.
Reversed.
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No. 12,144
Konicke, Plaintiff in Error, v. McFerson, Defendant in Error.
Decided September 10, 1928.
Banks and BankingStockholder's Liability
Facts-A bank commissioner brought
action to recover a statutory assessment upon stock of a defunct bank.
Konicke demurrered to complaint,
which was over-ruled, and elected to
stand on his demurrer. Konicke's contention was that the provisions of the
Session Laws of 1923, giving the bank
commissioner a lien upon the property
of a stockholder of an insolvent bank
to secure the payment of his assessment, is unconstitutional.
Held-Chapter 67, Session Laws of
1923, is by express terms an amendment of Section 39 of the banking act
of 1913, being Section 2696 of the 1921
Colorado Laws, which latter Section
creates and defines the stockholders'
liability in language identical with
that of the amendment. If the amendment is unconstitutional, the original
Section is still in force and sustains
the action; not decided whether or not
the amendment of 1923 was constitutional.
Judgment affirmed.

No. 12,166
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioners, v. the District Court of
the Second Judicial District, Respondents.
Decided September 10, 1928.
Prohibition
Facts-Defendants Bennett, Stearns,
and Bradford, and others, made an application in a criminal case for the
calling in of another Judge, claiming
that Judge Dunklee was prejudiced
against the Defendants. Application
was denied.
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Held-Not proper to issue a Writ of
Prohibition in a case of this kind, as
Writ of Prohibition will not be granted
except in matters publica juris, or
matters of great gravity and importance. Writ is not a writ of right and
whether or not it shall issue is within
the discretion of the Court; whether
the ruling of the Court below was
right or wrong can be determined in
the event that the Defendants are convicted through a Writ of Error.
No. 12.131
The Hugo National Bank, Plaintiff in
Error, v. Enoch J. Ashworth, Defendant in Error.
Decided September 10, 1928.
Creditor's Bill
Facts-The bank sued Ashworth, his
wife, and Childress, alleging that the
bank had reduced to judgment its
claim against Ashworth, and that Ashworth transferred certain real estate
to his wife without consideration,
which made him insolvent. After the
transfer, the wife contracted to sell
the property to Childress on time payments. Demurrer to complaint was
sustained below.
Held-Complaint stated a cause of
action. Creditor's bill was the proper
way to reach the property because the
title of the real estate was not in the
name of the judgment debtor.
Held Further-The sustaining of the
demurrer
and judgment of costs
against Plaintiff constituted final judgment which was appealable.
Judgment reversed.
"Ehuity is a roughish thing, for law
we have a measure. Equity Is according to the conscience of him that is
chancellor; and as that is larger or
narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as
if they should make the standard for
the measure."--John Selden.

